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Abstract. This article describes positive and negative security implications of classifying information.
The recent security scandals in the United States (US) involving Wen Ho Lee and John Deutch relate to
alleged violations of laws, policies, rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures for handling
classified information. The common response to these allegations has been not to question the
assumption that such violations have a security downside--let alone to ponder that the very process of
classifying information may have a downside as well as an upside.
Classifying information is intended to protect the security of the formally constituted authority
mandating such classification. The idea is that divulging certain types of information content, sources,
and means (among other characteristics) can lead to a chipping away at and even an infiltration of that
authority's protective mechanisms--at least if the divulging eventually reaches adversaries with the
ability and motivation to adversely affect that authority.
So such divulging must be impeded and minimized--if not prevented--through classification. Here
classification is a process that is intended to allow only certain people access to specific information. The
process usually involves some combination of labeling and physically protecting the information in
question as well as labeling and physically impeding or facilitating people's behavior as well.
However, the classifying process can work against security. It helps an adversary focus on what is
valuable because that which is not classified is deemed by the classifier not to be security valuable. In
essence, there's less information for an adversary to then attend to securing. Moreover, by providing
security clearances and access to "cleared" individuals, a formally constituted authority is signaling to an
adversary which people are worth monitoring and exploiting.
Paradoxically, some security violations of the type alleged to have been committed by Mr. Lee and Mr.
Deutch may support security as well as detract from it. By taking the classified labels off of classified
materials and by placing unlabeled but classified information on unclassified computer drives and tapes,
one is making the information appear less valuable and less worthy of adversary interest. As well--given
a social context wherein at least some information is overclassified or needlessly classified by virtually all
formally constituted authorities--some of the Lee and Deutch violations would be ever less likely to be
perceived helpful to adversaries then those adversaries' access to classified information garnered
through breaking into a protected system. (This analysis is based on the assumption that neither Mr. Lee
nor Mr. Deutch are espionage agents working against the US.
Newspaper classifieds are intended to call attention to sating the needs of readers. Properly secured
and managed classified information is much more likely to fulfill the same function than the information
left unsecured by Mr. Lee and Mr. Deutch. Thus, the real scandal in these two cases may be the
unfortunate psychology of classification as security-phillic. (See Bonner, R. Ex-official keeps Pentagon's
clearance after loss of C. I. A.'s. The New York Times, p. 17; Diggs, S. (1997). The plural taboo. Journal of
Analytical Psychology, 42, 459-479; Fiske, A.P., & Tetlock, P.E. (1997). Taboo trade-offs: Reactions to
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transactions that transgress the spheres of justice. Political Psychology, 18 255-297; Human fallacies and
personnel security: John Deutch and Wen Ho Lee. (February 4, 2000). IBPP, 8(5); Rawlings, D., &
Toogood, A. (1997). Using a "taboo response" measure to examine the relationship between divergent
thinking and psychoticism. Personality and Individual Differences, 22, 61-68.)(Keywords: Classification,
Deutch, Espionage, Lee, Personnel Security.)
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